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STATE REACTIONS TO THE TRADING OF EMISSIONS
ALLOWANCES UNDER TITLE IV OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990
Deborah M. Mostaghel*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Sulfur dioxide (S02) and nitrous oxide (NOx) trigger acid rain when
they react with water vapor in the atmosphere. The reaction forms
sulfuric acid and nitric acid, which then fall back to earth as acid rain
or snow.! The S02 and NOx that cause acid rain come primarily from
the burning of fossil fuels by electric utilities.2 In the United States,
electric utilities emit approximately sixteen million tons of S02 and
seven million tons of NO xannually.3 Although the emissions of S02 and
NOx come primarily from coal-burning power plants in the east and
the midwest, the problem is not merely local. The emissions travel in
the atmosphere, sometimes for hundreds of miles, before they fall
back to earth as acid rain or snow.4 The Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 (the 1990 Amendments)5 are the most recent and the strongest
legislative attempt to secure the goal of clean air for every American.6
Congress's finding in support of Title IV-that "the problem of acid
deposition is of national and international significance"7-indicates
* Instructor, The University of Toledo College of Law, J.D. The University of Utah College
of Law 1988.
1 Acid Rain Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,004 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R § 72).
242 U.S.C. §§ 7651(a)(2), (a)(7) (1988).
3 Acid Rain Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 3,590 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 72).
4 Robert E. Cattanach, Jr. & Peter V. O'Connor, Environmental Concerns Raised By the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 18 WM. MITcHELL L. REV. 461, 473 (1992).
5 Clean Air Act, Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7407 et seq. (1983 & Supp. V 1993).
6 See Statement of President George Bush upon signing S. 1630, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N.3887-1 (1990).
742 U.S.C. § 7651(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
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both the environmental and the economic devastation wrought by
acid rain. The Clean Air Act Amendments include eleven titles covering a wide variety of clean air provisions.s Of these provisions, one
of the most innovative is Title IV.9 The purpose of Title IV is to reduce
significantly the power plant emissions of acid rain precursors. 10
To cut down on the S02 emissions from coal-fired electric utilities,
Title IV creates a two-pronged approach. First, it sets a national cap
on emissions. Title IV allocates to each utility a number of pollution
allowances to emit a certain amount of S02.11 The sum of all the
allowances equals the nationwide cap. Second, Title IV recasts S02 as
a commodity. If a utility does not need all of its allowances in a
particular year, it may either trade them on a public exchange,12 or it
may arrange private sales to a utility that needs more allowances to
stay within its emissions limit. 13
The Environmental Protection Agency has delegated administration of annual auctions of emissions allowances to the Chicago Board
of Trade. 14 The Board of Trade held the first auction on March 29,
1993,15 and the second on March 28, 1994.16 The marginal interest in
these auctions suggests that market trading will probably not be a
significant factor in utilities' short-term compliance with Title IV,
8 Title I provides for attainment and maintenance of National Ambient Air Quality Standards,
discussed infra at note 20 and accompanying text. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7403-7515 (Supp. V 1993). Title
II governs mobile sources. [d. at §§ 7520-7590. Title III sets standards for hazardous air
pollutants. [d. at §§ 7601-7627. Title IV deals with acid rain. [d. at §§ 7651-76510. Title V
introduces a permit program to achieve the NAAQS. [d. at §§ 7661-766lf. Title VI regulates
ozone-ilepleting substances. [d. at §§ 7671-7671q. Title VII relates to enforcement. [d. at
§§ 7401, 7413, 7414, 7420, 7477, 7603, 7604. Title VIII and Title IX mandate air pollution studies.
Relevant sections of Title Vln are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7612, 7492, and 7409 (1983 &
Supp. V 1993). Title IX is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7403 and 7404 (1983 & Supp. V 1993). Title X
directs the Enviromnental Protection Agency to establish a research program that ,vill report
on the effects of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (Supp. V 1993). Title XI establishes relief
for businesses and individuals suffering economic hardship that results from the Clean Air Act.
29 U.S.C. § 1662e and 29 U.S.C. § 1502 (1983 & Supp. V 1993).
942 U.S.C. § 7551. (Supp. V 1993).
10 For discussion of the target levels, see infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. This
Article focuses on S02 because its volume is greater than that of NOx and because there is no
emissions allowance system for NOx comparable to that for S02.
1142 U.S.C. § 7651b(a) (Supp. V 1993).
12 This is accomplished under the allocation and transfer system of 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (Supp.
V 1993). See also id. at § 76510 (governing auction sales).
13 A utility emitting S02 or NOx in excess of its allowances is subject to an excess emissions
penalty. [d. at § 7651j (Supp. V 1993).
14 EPA Reveals Air Pollution Allowance Results, COAL WEEK, Apr. 5, 1993, at 8.
15 [d.
1G Chicago Board of Prade Conducts Second Annual Emission Allowance Auction, Daily
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 30, 1994).
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perhaps because the industry has to gain familiarity with the market
concept and with pricing strategies.17 While a few utilities are beginning to trade in the market, more utilities are engaging directly in
private buying and selling of emissions allowances.
States have raised unforeseen objections to some of their utilities'
private trades of emissions allowances. This Article will discuss these
trades, the responses states have already made, and possible responses states may still make. Specifically, Section II explains why
Title IV is built on market-based incentives and how the program
works. Section III details the various state reactions to Title IV.
These reactions include lawsuits and threats of legislative action to
control utilities' emissions allowance trades. Section III also identifies
state laws that control acid deposition, and state laws that control the
use of state coal, to see if states use these laws to circumvent Title
IV, Section IV analyzes the various state lawsuits and laws identified
in Section III. Section V concludes that the most serious threat to
utilities' ability to trade emissions freely is state legislation that would
require state oversight of an in-state utility's trade with an out-ofstate utility. These essentially local reactions could derail the Clean
Air Act's nationwide approach to solving the acid rain problem. Since
the allowance program does not include NOx, the Article discusses
only S02.
II. TITLE IV
A. Why The Title N Approach?
Clean air legislation was initially concerned with research on air
pollution problems.ls Programs to control air pollution followed, but
these programs generally lacked enforcement mechanisms. 19 In the
Clean Air Act of 1970,20 Congress granted some enforcement authority to the infant Environmental Protection Agency,21 and Congress
strengthened that authority when it passed the Clean Air Act
17 [d.

1S Air Pollution Control Research and Technical Assistance, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 360
(1955).
19 See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, '17 Stat. 392 (1963) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993» (the first Clean Air Act); Air Quality Act, Pub. L. No.
90-148,81 Stat. 485 (1967) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993».
20 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993».
21 President Richard Nixon created the EPA by executive order in 1970. Reorganization Plan
No.3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
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Amendments of 1977.22 The 1977 Amendments developed national
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), that establish the maximum
permissible atmospheric concentrations of certain pollutants.23 The
1977 Amendments also required individual states to develop state
implementation plans (SIPs) to achieve these air quality standards.24
If the ambient concentration of a pollutant exceeded the NAAQS in
a particular geographic area, EPA designated that area a "non-attainment" area for that pollutant.25 On the other hand, EPA designated
areas where the ambient concentration registered less than the NAAQS
as "attainment areas."26
Over the years, the SIPs proved to be an ineffective mechanism for
implementing and enforcing the Clean Air Act and its amendments.27
SIPs required utilities to implement control technologies and to decrease S02 emissions depending on whether they were located in
attainment or non-attainment areas.28 The SIPs gave no regard to
how hard or how easy it would be for a particular utility to comply.29
Some utilities found it cheaper to pay fines than to comply.30 Other
utilities could not comply within the statutory deadlines.3!
In the 1990 Amendments, Congress focused on market-based incentives to achieve the goal of reducing S02 emissions nationwide.32 Title
IV employs a new "allocation and transfer system" for trading emissions allowances33 augmenting the SIPs' traditional regulation by command and control.34 Congress expects the more flexible emissions
22 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (cUlTent version
at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993».
23 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1983 & Supp. V 1993).
24 Id. at § 7410.
25 Id. at § 7501(2).
26 Id. at §§ 7407-7491.
Z1 The competing interests of fostering industrial growth and attaining air quality that the
states had to consider in their SIPs inhibited compliance and attainment. Daniel F. O'Sullivan,
The Clean Air Act Amendments of1990: Permits and Enforcement-The Guts of the New Law,
18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 281 (1993).
28 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1983 & Supp. V 1993). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.20-.2632 (1993) (describing
each state's SIP).
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1983 & Supp. V 1993). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.20-.2632 (1993).
30 Samuel Hays, Clean Air: From the 1970 Act to the 1977 Amendments, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 33,
39, 42 (1978--1979).
31 SIPs were to attain the NAAQS within nine months after their promulgation under the
1977 version of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(I) (1983). Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 101(d)(8),
substituted "3 years (or such shorter period as the Administrator may prescribe)" for "nine
months" throughout the section. Id. (Supp. V 1993).
32 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a) & (b) (Supp. V 1993).
33

Id.

24

Preexisting Clean Air Act requirements continue in force. Id. at § 7651l (Supp. V 1993).
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trading system, which has been called the "centerpiece of the Acid
Rain Program," to make it easier and more practical for utilities
nationwide to reduce total emissions of S02 within the statute's timetable.35
B. How Title IV Works

Title IV provides market-based incentives. Title IV allocates a
certain number of tradeable pollution allowances yearly to each utility.36 Each allowance authorizes the utility to emit one ton of S02
annually.37 To avoid emitting more S02 than allowed, a utility has
several options. It may buy and burn cleaner, low-sulfur coal. It may
install clean-coal technologies to reduce its S02 emissions. If a switch
to low-sulfur coal or the installation of clean-coal technologies38 is not
feasible, the utility can obtain more allowances.39 Obtaining more allowances will enable the utility to maintain its level of emissions without
incurring fines. 40
The acquisition of more allowances may be an attractive option for
utilities that find it cost ineffective to install pollution-control equipment immediately. Thus, the argument raised by environmental groups
and others that these allowances are a ''license to pollute"41 may hold
true in the short run. Indeed, it is true that a utility that obtains more
emissions allowances may avoid emissions reductions for a time.42
The license-to-pollute argument, however, does not hold true in the
long run.43 It does not hold true because limitations in existing SIPs
35 58
36 42

Fed. Reg. 15,635 (1993).
u.s.c. § 7651b(a) (Supp. V 1993).
:n Id. at § 7651a(3) (Supp. V 1993).
38 Clean-coal technologies fall into several categories. Precombustion technologies include coal
washing and coal liquefying or gasifying. See S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3675. Combustion technology includes fluidized bed combustion, id. at 294-95, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3677-78. Postcombustion technology, the
most commonly used technology, is called "flue gas desulfurization" or "scrubbing." Id. at 296,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3679.
39 See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
40 42 U.S.C. § 7651j (Supp. V 1993). A utility that emits more S02 than it has allowances for
in a given year must pay a penalty of two thousand dollars per ton of excess and must, for each
ton of excess emitted in the given year, reduce its emissions by an additional ton in the next
year. Id.
41 See Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion
ofEnvironmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.,
565, 573 n.49 (1992) (citing PROJECT 88-ROUND 11, INCENTIVES FOR ACTION: DESIGNING
MARKET BASED ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES 1-4 (Robert N. Stavins ed. 1991».
42 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b(b), (1) (Supp. V 1993).
43 Id. at § 7651(b). See also infra note 47.
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remain in force. 44 In addition, in order to see reductions quickly, EPA
will implement Title IV's mandated S02 emissions reductions in two
phases. Phase I requires that, by the year 2000, utilities must reduce
S02 emissions to fifty percent of 1980 levels.45 Phase II requires that,
starting January 1, 2000,46 the sum of emissions from all coal-fired
utilities can be no more than 8.9 million tons annually. EPA will set
new allocations of emissions allowances for each utility yearly.47 EPA
will base these allocations on the utility's historical fuel consumption
and on the allowable emissions rate.48 EPA will implement the fifty
percent reduction in emissions targeted for the year 2000 during
Phase I of the program.49 Phase I, effective January 1, 1995,50 regulates the 110 utilities in the nation with the highest rates of S02
emissions.51 Most of these utilities are located in twenty-one midwestern and eastern states.52 Starting in 1995, EPA will annually allocate
to utilities allowances for fewer tons of S02 than they emit.53 Thus, by
the year 2000 Phase I utilities together will emit roughly fifty percent
less S02 than they did in 1980.54 The average allowable emissions rate
for the affected units55 in Phase I is 2.51bs SOzlmmBTU.56
Phase II, effective January 1, 2000,57 will encompass some additional
700 power plants, comprised of approximately 2000 units, located
throughout the contiguous forty-eight states.58 Phase II, when the 8.9
million ton annual limit becomes effective, will lower the average
allowable emissions rate from the 2.5 Ibs/mmBTU of Phase I to 1.2
Ibs/mmBTU.59 The mandated reductions of Phase I and Phase II will
ld. at § 7651l.
at § 7651b(a)(I).
46 ld.
47 ld. The number of annually allocated allowances will be less than the electric utility industry's current S02 emissions, until the target cap is reached in the year 2000. S. REP. No. 228,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 275--82 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3658-66.
48 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a)(I) (Supp. V 1993).
49 ld.
50 ld. at § 7651c.
51 ld.
52 ld. at § 7651c(e) tbl A.
52 ld. at § 7651c(a)(I).
54Id.
55 An affected unit is a unit subject to emission reduction requirements or limitations under
Title rv. 42 U.S.C. § 7651a(2) (Supp. V 1993).
56 S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 302 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3685.
The quantity of fossil fuel consumed by an affected unit is measured in millions of British
Thermal Units (mmBTUs). 42 U.S.C. § 7651a(4) (Supp. V 1993).
57 ld. at § 7651d (Supp. V 1993).
58 ld. at § 7651d(b)(I).
59 ld.
44

45 ld.
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result in allowable yearly emissions, in the year 2000 and after, that
are ten million tons lower than yearly emissions during the 1980s.60
Each year the number of allowances allocated to utilities will decrease until the nationwide limit is reached, and this reduction will
have a market effect. As the number of available allowances decreases, their value as commodities will rise, and the cost to obtain
excess allowances will increase. At some point, some utilities may find
it cheaper to reduce emissions than to buy allowances. If these utilities reduce emissions below their allotted allowances, they can sell
their extra allowances to other utilities unable to make reductions.61
Thus, Title IV lets utilities harness market forces to achieve compliance with the statute's pollution-reduction goals, and it ensures, in the
long term, that allowances are not ''licenses to pollute."62

III.

UNANTICIPATED REACTIONS TO TRADING UNDER TITLE IV:
LAWSUITS AND THREATS OF RESTRICTIVE STATE LAWS

As utilities enter into allowance trading agreements among themselves, however, unanticipated state reactions raise troubling possibilities. Emissions trades have spurred a lawsuit against trading and
threats of new state laws that would restrict trades when the trade
is perceived as allowing more pollution to drift over the very state
from which the allowances were sold.63 In these instances the relevant
state considered the utility's attempts to comply with Title IV to be
detrimental to the state. Both responses-lawsuits and restrictive
state laws-could hinder the free trading of allowances and undercut
Title IV's effectiveness.
GO 56

Fed. Reg. 63,004.
may buy emissions allowances. 42 U.S.C. § 7651O(c)(2) (Supp. V 1993). In the first
auction, held March 29, 1993 by the Chicago Board of Trade, while utilities generally submitted
the highest bids and won most of the allowances, bids came from many other sources, including
brokers, public interest groups, and private investors. Utilities Buy Most S02 Allowances at
Low Prices in First EPA Auction, INDEPENDENT POWER REP., Apr. 9, 1993, at 14. One
successful public interest group, Ecotech International, won a single allowance for $450, the
highest bid made. First Auction Sends Price Signal, Seen Stimulating Allowance Market,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK. (formerly ELECTRICAL WK.), Apr. 5, 1993, at 3. For a list of allowance
auction results, see EPA/Chicago Board of Trade Allowance Auction Results, UTIL. ENV'T
REP., Apr. 2, 1993, at 9.
62 There has also been at least one quixotic pollution reduction gesture: in March, 1993,
Northeast Utilities donated 10,000 or (seven percent) ofits anticipated 150,000 emissions allowances to the American Lung Association, which inmlediately retired them. Susan E. Kinsman,
NU Donates Pollution Allowance, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 20, 1993 (A Edition), at Bl.
63 The lawsuit is New York v. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 93-1214 (D.C. Cir., filed
Mar. 12, 1993). For discussion of the proposed legislation, see infra notes 74-82 and accompanyingtext.
61 Anyone
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Lawsuit

Regulators in New York state filed suit against EPA to limit trades
that New York thinks will simply move pollution from one place to
another. Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO), a New York utility,
received S02 allowances under the 1990 Amendments for pollution
control measUres that it had instituted in the 1980s. LILCO sold an
option to buy these S02 allowances to Amax Energy, Inc. (Amax), of
Greenwich, Connecticut. Amax, an energy broker, planned to sell
packages of allowances and coal or natural gas to utilities in the
midwest.64 Environmental groups in New York expressed concern
that allowances sold to midwestern utilities would result in airborne
pollution iliifting east and coming to rest in New York.65 The New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) then
filed suit against EPA,66 alleging that EP.Ns S02 allowance trading
rules would allow midwestern utilities to "spew more than their share
of emissions" and that EPA failed to establish an oversight mechanism for trading allowances.67 New York wanted EPA to restrict
trades that could result in the introduction of S02 emissions from
outside the state into environmentally sensitive areas of New York. 6S
In supporting New York's position, DEC Commissioner Thomas
J orling stated that:
Unless the market approach is connected to achieving reductions
in acid deposition, the trading of allowances could result in utilities in the Midwest purchasing credits and continuing to emit
massive loadings of sulfur to the atmosphere at the expense of
environmentally sensitive areas of New York and other northeastern states and Canada.69

J orling may have intended his statement as a scare tactic, since the
market approach is indeed connected to achieving reductions. Utilities may only sell or trade emissions allowances after the utilities have
met the federally imposed reductions.70 LILCO had excess allowances
Margaret Kriz, Emission Control, 25 NAT'L J. 1696, 1697 (1993).
Handling of Allowance Trading Questioned, 14 COAL & SYNFUELS TECH., No. 11,
(Mar. 22, 1993).
66 New York v. EPA, No. 93-1214 (D.C. Cir., filed Mar. 12, 1993).
!;l EPA Handling of Allowance Trading Questioned, supra note 65.
63 Paul Merrion, Pollution Trading Opens In Legal, Regulatory Haze, CRAIN'S CmCAGO Bus.,
Mar. 22, 1993, at 4.
&I

65 EPA

69 EPA Handling of Allowance Trading Law Faces Double Challenge in U.S. Court, 21
ENERGY REP., No. 11 (Mar. 22, 1993).
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (Supp. V 1993).
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to sell because it had already implemented control measures that
brought its emissions levels below those mandated by Title IV.7l
But because Title IV restricts emission levels starting as early as
1995, many utilities will not be able to install clean-coal technology or
switch fuel supply sources in time. Thus, they must acquire extra
allowances to avoid fines for noncompliance.
By 2000, Title IV will have reduced total S02 emissions from all
sources by fifty percent.72 Still, one may argue for J orting's position.
While the flexible free-market trading scheme will result in lowered
emissions nationwide, there is no guarantee that every area of the
country will see equal pollution reductions. The extent to which midwestern utilities will use technology, cleaner coal, or allowances to
meet the statute's requirements cannot yet be predicted. When Congress chose to. try the market approach to reducing S02 emissions,
however, it rejected the inclusion of regional limitations and federal
oversight mechanisms in Title IV.73 Thus, it is unlikely that Congress
would be willing to change Title IV any time soon, despite New York's
suit.
B. The Threat of Restrictive State Laws

1. State Legislation to Control Trades: New York and Wisconsin
More threatening than a lawsuit to the free play of the market is
the response to Title IV emissions allowance trades evinced by some
state legislators who seek to control trades through restrictive state
legislation. In response to LILCO's sale to Amax,74 New York state
legislators introduced a bill to regulate the allowance trading of New
York's utilities. Specifically, the bill seeks to prohibit sales or trades
of emissions allowances to upwind utilities.75 The New York measure
71 To settle part of New York's suit, EPA has proposed the canceling ofS02 emissions credits
for pollution cuts that New York made before Title IV was passed. Clean Air Act: EPA May
Close "Looplwle," N.Y. Enviros Pleased, American Political Network, Dec. 9, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Greenwire File.
72 See supra notes 45--56 and accompanying text.
'23 Acid Rain Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 3,590, 3,600, 3,614-15 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R §§ 72--73,
75,77-78).
74 See Kriz, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
75 New York Assemblyman Richard Brodsky introduced Assembly Bill 3569 on February 10,
1993. The Assembly's Committee on Energy Conservation passed an amended version on March
25, 1993 that is now under study by the New York Senate Committee on Energy. Susan
Millington Campbell & Andrew S. Holmes, Going Once, Going Twice, Sold! EPA Auctions
Pollution Rights; Market-Based System Permits Sale of Allowances to Emit Sulfur Dioxide,
N.Y.L.J., 10-11 (July 7, 1993).
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would require utilities to clear their allowance trades with the state
"to ensure sufficient review of the potential acid deposition of such
actions in sensitive receptor areas of the state...."76
Wisconsin legislators reacted similarly to a Wisconsin utility's sale
of emissions allowances. Wisconsin Power and Light Company, based
in Madison, sold 35,000 allowances to the Tennessee Valley Authority
in May, 1992.77 Wisconsin Power and Light's announcement ofthe sale
triggered public concern in Wisconsin about "secret trading of pollution rights."78 Five citizen action groups79 put forth the view that sales
of allowances to utilities in so-called "dirtier" states "upwind from
environmentally sensitive lakes and forests in Wisconsin, the N ortheast and the Appalachian Mountains"80 were not environmentally sensible.81 At the urging of these groups, Wisconsin legislators are contemplating the introduction of legislation to require that the terms of
any proposed purchase or sale of S02 emission allowances be publicly
disclosed, that the Wisconsin Public Service Commission approve
trades before they are made, and that the Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources review proposed trades for environmental impacts.82

76 A.B. 3569, § 2, 215th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. sess. (1993) (amending the public service law
by adding a new section 66-j, at the second paragraph).
77 TVA to Buy Emission Credits from Utility, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1992, at C2.
78 Wisconsin Legislator Urges Bill to Prohibit 'Secret' Allowance Trades By Utilities, UTIL.
ENV'T REP., Apr. 16, 1993, at 14 (hereinafter Wisconsin Legislator Urges Bill) (Statement of
WISconsin state representative Peter Bock (D-Milwaukee».
79 Citizens for a Better Environment, the Citizens' Utility Board, Wisconsin's Environmental
Decade, Sierra Club/John Muir Chapter and RENEW (Renewable Energy For Wisconsin). Id.
80 Kriz, supra note 64, at 1697.
SlId.
&! Wisconsin Legislator Urges Bill, supra note 78, at 14. Public disclosure of purchase or sales
terms would be significantly more restrictive than existing Wisconsin law. Legislation introduced in WISconsin in 1991 called for rules "consistent with but no more restrictive than the
federal clean air act" to specify amounts of emissions. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.31(1)(r) (West
Supp. 1993). In a phone call to the office of the bill's proponent, Representative Peter Bock, on
February 1, 1994, legislative assistant Brad Kelly said that this legislation is still in the drafting
stage. Wisconsin Legislator Urges Bill, supra note 78, at 14.
Laws like this might very well withstand commerce clause challenge. Congress, pursuant to
the commerce clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, has ultimate authority to regulate interstate
commerce, traditionally defined as anything in the flow of traffic between or among states.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). State laws that regulate the flow of interstate
commerce have withstood attack if they serve a legitimate state interest and are applied
evenhandedly. Raymond Motor 'fransp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978). When a state law
is attacked on commerce clause grounds for obstructing the flow of commerce, the court will
balance the state's need to regulate against the federal government's need for uniformity in laws
affecting interstate commerce. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). A
common balancing standard is the three-prong test of Pike, requiring evenhanded regulation,
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2. State Laws to Control Acid Deposition

While no state has yet passed laws to control emissions trades
between in-state and out-of-state utilities, several states have passed
acid deposition controllaws.83 In their current form, these laws do not
appear to threaten allowance trading between in- and out-of-state
utilities. However, some of these laws regulate in-state trades.84 In
1984, long before A.B. 3569, the bill currently under review,85 New
York implemented a sulfur deposition control program.86 New York's
legislative findings included the recognition that, "although the major
sources of acid deposition precursors are located within the midwestern United States and certain provinces of Canada, emissions from
sources within the state contributed significantly to acid deposition in
the state."B7 The acid deposition control program established interim
deposition control targets, which took effect in 1988.88 The program
identified emissions reductions necessary to achieve the target for
stationary sources in the state.89 To achieve a control target, even now
in New York, a stationary source is neither required to nor prohibited
from adopting "any particular control technique."90
Wisconsin has had air pollution control laws on the books at least
since 1967.91 In implementing legislation in 1983 to provide S02 emission limitations that would be effective from 1985 to 1993, the Wisconsin Legislature found that the increase in S02 emissions from stationary sources contributed to the acid deposition problem and threatened
natural resources.92 The Wisconsin Legislature also found that most
fulfillment of a legitimate local purpose, and incidental effect on interstate commerce. Id. In a
constitutional challenge to a law like the one proposed in WISCOnsin, the state would argue that
its law regulates evenhandedly, addresses a significant state interest, and has but an incidental
effect on interstate commerce.
The proposed WISCOnsin legislation is arguably different from the Illinois statute that a
federal district court struck down in Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554 (N.D.
Ill. 1993). See infra notes 173--98 and accompanying text. The Alliance court held that the Illinois
statute violated the commerce clause because it discriminated against interstate commerce on
its face. See 840 F.2d at 561. The WISCOnsin legislation as currently proposed does not appear
to do that.
83 See infra notes 85-122 and accompanying text.

SlId.
See A.B. 3569, supra note 76.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 19-0907 through 19-0911 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
f;l N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW, Historical & Statutory Notes following § 19-0901.
88 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 19-0909.
88 Id. at § 19-0907.3.
90 Id. at § 19-0909.2.
91 See WIS. STAT. ANN., Historical Note following § 144.31. (West 1989).
92 See WIS. STAT. ANN., Historical Note (2) following § 144.385 (West 1989).
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of the S02 emissions in Wisconsin came from major utility operations.93
In addition, it found that, "in the short term, major utility operators
could ensure that this state's total S02 emissions [were] not excessive
while incurring minimum or no additional costs by cooperating and
coordinating their activities...."94 The legislature capped the combined S02 emissions of its major utilities for the years 1985 through
1993 at 500,000 tons annually.95 Although the legislature designated
caps for individual utilities, those caps would apply only if the total
emissions cap for all utilities were exceeded.96 The legislature required major utilities to submit a joint annual operation plan. This
plan must include individual annual operation plans, each utility's
emissions limitation, and information on how the utilities would cooperate to comply with the total annual limitation.97 In 1985 the Wisconsin Legislature added S02 emission rates and emission trading
rules that would apply after 1992.98 Under these rules, any two major
Wisconsin utilities may enter into agreements with each other for
trading emissions, subject to Department of Natural Resources oversight.99
Wisconsin's current laws encourage local government units to handle air pollution problems on a local and regional basis.1°O They require
cooperation between the Department of Natural Resources and other
states or interstate agencies.101 Wisconsin statutes do not yet address
trades between a major Wisconsin utility and an out-of-state utility.
In addition to New York and Wisconsin, several other states have
passed acid deposition controllaws.102 Among the eastern seaboard
states, Maine implemented an acid deposition control statute in
1985.103 The legislature found that acid deposition "poses a present and
severe threat to the state's natural resources, including its fish and
wildlife, agriculture and water resources, as well as to the State's
economy and public health."l04 The legislature authorized an Acid
Rain Impact Study to determine the contributions of in-state and
[d. at Historical Note (4).
[d. at Historical Note (5).
95 [d. at Historical Note (3).
96 [d. at Historical Note (3)(b).
97 [d. at Historical Note (4).
98 [d. at § 144.386.
99 [d. at § 144.386(2)(b)(1).
100 [d. at § 144.31(1)(c).
101 [d. at § 144.31(2)(e).
102 See infra notes 103-22 and accompanying text.
103 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 603-B (West 1989).
104 [d. at § 603-B(1).
93

!J.I

1995]

EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES

213

out-of-state sources to the state's deposition.105 But it made no mention of emissions trading.
New Hampshire adopted similar legislation in June, 1985.106 New
Hampshire also found that, although acid rain precursor emissions
come primarily from the midwest/07 sources within New Hampshire
contribute to acid deposition not only in New Hampshire but also in
Maine and Massachusetts.1os New Hampshire's Acid Rain Deposition
Control Program, as amended in 1990, defined ''baseline emissions" as
the total S02 emissions "in tons per calendar year averaged over the
period 1979 through 1982 from all major sources."l09 Under the program, the Department of Environmental Services was required to
develop a two-phase acid deposition control program. In the first
phase, the program required a twenty-five percent S02 reduction
from the baseline emissions by December 31, 1991.110 In the second
phase, the goal is a fifty percent reduction by December 31, 1996.111
The Department of Environmental Services will adopt rules to monitor compliance. l12 There is no mention of trades.
Maryland's law1I3 directs its departments of Natural Resources and
Environment114 to examine the possible contribution to a reduction of
acid deposition of "enhanced conservation activities by electric utilities."115 Furthermore, these agencies must identify and analyze emissions trading.1I6
Pennsylvania's acid deposition statute simply restates the requirements of Title IV.ll7 The statute prohibits S02 emissions greater than
the annual number of allowances that an owner or an operator of a
unit holds,118 forbids exceeding applicable emissions rates or standards,119 and prohibits use of an allowance before the year for which it
has been aliocated.12O
Id. at § 603-B(2).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-D:1 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
107 Id. at § 125-D:1.II.
108 Id.
109 Id. at § 125-D:2.III.
110 Id. at § 125-D:3.I.
III Id. at § 125-D:3.II.(b).
112 Id.
113 MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES., § 3-3A-01-04 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
114 Id. at § 3-3A-01(e).
115 Id. at § 3-3A-01(1l).
116 Id. at § 3-3A-04(g)(ii).
117 35 P A. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4006.5 (1993).
118 Id. at § 4006.5(e)(1).
119 Id. at § 4006.5(e)(2).
120 Id. at § 4006.5(e)(3).
105
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Inland, Iowa has amended its environmental protection statutes to
provide for adoption of rules consistent with the Clean Air Act's
permitting provisions. They require an operator of an air contaminant
source to obtain an operating permit.121 The permits for sources subject to Title IV "shall include emission allowances for S02 emission."l22
The Iowa amendments, however, make no mention of restrictions on
emissions trading.
In general, states with acid deposition control laws recognize both
locally produced and wind-borne S02 emissions as an environmental
threat, and authorize control measures that are consistent with the
Clean Air Act. In their present form, none of these laws appears to
restrict emissions trading between in-state and out-of-state utilities.
3. State Laws to Control the Use of Coal
State laws that restrict utilities' attempts to trade emissions, even
if they result in less wind-borne pollution landing within home-state
borders, would threaten Title IV's ability to cut down on emissions
nationwide. Another, quite different, type of state law could have the
same effect: states that produce high-sulfur coal might try to restrict
allowance trading to protect their coal industries. The achievement
of Title IV's national pollution reduction goal might be slowed as
utilities scramble to implement new coal-cleaning technologies while
continuing to use high-sulfur coal. To date, though, with the exception
of Illinois,l23 states that produce high-sulfur coal have generally attempted to protect their coal industries by expressing a preference
that coal-burning utilities within the state use locally produced coal.124
The degree to which these states control the utilities' choice of coal
varies.
a. States That Are Somewhat Dependent on High-Sulfur Coal
Production
The economies of Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and
Tennessee all rely to some degree on the mining of high-sulfur coal.
The Arkansas legislature protects the state's coal-mining industry
121 1993 Iowa Legis. Serv. H.F. 331 (West), amending § 455B. 133(8.a) (approved May 19,
1993).
122 Id.
122llIinois's statutes are the most protective. See infra notes 176-93 and accompanying text.
124 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 73.1 (1989 & Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 34.080,
§ 260.035.1(15)(b) (1990 & Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-3-811 (1989 & Supp. 1993).
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through a requirement that at least ten percent of the coal that
utilities burn in coal-fired plants must be mined in Arkansas.125 The
legislature will relax the requirement if there are valid technical,
economical, or environmental reasons.126 Further, "a utility need not
comply if the use of ten percent Arkansas coal would result in higher
costs to consumers than existing or alternative coal purchase arrangements."I27 Additionally, if a public utility's compliance with the ten
percent rule forces the utility to exceed any applicable state or federal
air quality emission standards, the requirement is reduced.128
Indiana requires state institutions to buy and use Indiana coal
unless federal regulations require the use oflow-sulfur coaU29 Indiana
does not require public utilities to purchase Indiana coal. It is possible
that a public utility, to meet its requirements under the Clean Air Act,
would propose a change of fuel type that would displace or diminish
use of Indiana coaU30 In such a case, the public utility must also
analyze the economic and employment effects of the change131 and its
effects on Indiana coal as a viable source of fueU32 To win Public
Utility Commission approval, a public utility's plan must either provide for continued or increased use of Indiana coal or be justified by
economic considerations.l33
Iowa gives a preference to Iowa-mined coal. l34 Further, Iowa may
grant local coal up to a five percent preference over out-of-state coaU35
Missouri requires its public institutions to purchase and use coal
that is mined in Missouri or an adjoining state, provided the cost of
that coal is not higher than the cost of coal from other states.136
Missouri's Environmental Improvement Authority is authorized to
help finance the development and marketing of "[m]eans of energy
125 ARK.

CODE ANN. § 23-1B-105(a)(3) (Michie 1993).
[d. at § 23-1B-105(a). The ten percent requirement is valid "[t]o the extent that it is
technically, economically, and environmentally feasible." [d.
1Z1 [d. at § 23-1B-105(b)(1)(A).
128 [d. at § 23-1B-105(b)(2). Specifically, "[n]o public utility shall be required to comply with
this section [the ten percent rule] if to do so would result in the utility exceeding any of its state
or federal air quality emissions standards or any other conditions of its environmental permits."
[d.
129 IND. CODE ANN. § 5-17-3-1 (West 1989).
130 [d. at § B-1-27-6(b)(6).
131 [d. at § 6(b)(6)(A)(i).
132 [d. at § 6(b)(6)(A)(ii).
133 [d. at § B-1-27-8(1)(D)(ii).
134 IOWA CODE § 73.1 (1992).
135 [d. at § 73.7.
135 Mo. REV. STAT. § 34.080.1. (1992).
126
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production utilizing energy sources other than fossil or nuclear
fuel. ...."137 Additionally, the MEIA is authorized to help finance the
development and marketing of "[fjossil fuels and recycled fossil fuels
which are indigenous energy resources produced in the state of Missouri,
including coal, heavy oil and tar sands."l38
Tennessee, like Missouri, directs state agencies and institutions to
purchase coal mined in Tennessee if the delivered price is equal to or
less than that of coal mined outside Tennessee.139
While the approach of all of these states is to promote but not to
require the use of state-mined coal, Illinois has gone further. Some of
Illinois's coal laws express the typical preference for state-produced
coal. Illinois requires institutions supported in whole or in part by
public funds, or those owned by municipal corporations or political
subdivisions, to purchase coal mined in Illinois if the cost of that coal
does not exceed by more than ten percent the cost of coal mined in
other states.140 Also, Illinois desires that Illinois coal use be consistent
with environmental standards.141 Unlike these typical requirements,
however, Illinois's Public Utilities Act of 1991142 went beyond expressing a preference for the use of locally produced coal. The Public
Utilities Act actually required the installation of scrubbers on Illinois's large generating units to enable the units to continue to burn
Illinois coal.l43 The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
responding to a constitutional challenge on commerce clause grounds,
enjoined enforcement of the Public Utilities Act. l44
Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Tennessee employ precatory language to aid their high-sulfur coal industries. These states'
laws neither directly nor indirectly inhibit emissions trades. In fact,
a percentage requirement like that of Arkansas, that a utility use ten
percent state-produced coal unless there are valid reasons not to,145
could encourage Arkansas utilities to buy emissions to offset continued use of in-state coal. Illinois's law, on the other hand, would have
foreclosed Illinois utilities from trading. Units that installed scrub-

137 [d.

at § 260.035.1(15)(a).
at § (15)(b).
139 TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-3-811 (1993).
140 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 555/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
141 [d. at ch. 20, para. 3515/2(a)(1).
142 [d. at ch. 220, para. 5/8-402.1.
143 The Public Utilities Act affected the four largest public utility plants in Illinois. Alliance
for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 559 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
144 See infra notes 176-98 and accompanying text.
145 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-18-105(a) (Michie 1993).
138 [d.
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bers to continue burning Illinois coal would not be in the market to
buy emissions credits.
b. States That Are Heavily Dependent on High-Sulfur Goa!
Production

Since the major way for utilities to reduce S02 emissions is to cut
down on their use of high-sulfur coal, commentators have suggested
that Title IV may have a disproportionately heavy adverse effect on
the high-sulfur coal mining industries in Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West VIrginia, states that are leaders in coal production.146 So
far, industry reactions indicate awareness but not panic. For example,
in the March 29, 1993 auction of emissions allowances, of the 150,010
allowances sold,147 midwest utilities accounted for only a small percentage of sales. Kentucky Utilities Company bought 12,900 spot
allowances and no advance allowances. PSI Energy, Inc. of Indiana
bought 10,000 spot allowances, and Illinois Power bought 5,000 spot
allowances. In contrast, Carolina Power and Light Company bought
85,103 spot and advance allowances.l48
The legislative reaction is similarly low-key. Ohio created a coal
development office in 1985,149 which must submit to the governor an
annual coal development agenda.150 Among other things, the agenda
must include a "characterization of the current and potential markets
for Ohio coal"151 and a description of projects to enhance ''user markets
for Ohio coal."152 The Ohio Legislature proposed a bill in 1991 expressly to protect Ohio rate payers and coal miners from the impact
of Phase I of the 1990 Amendments. l53 The bill would have required
146 But

see Clean Air Act Title X, Disadvantaged Business Concerns, codified at 42

u.s.c.

§ 7601, and Title XI, Clean Air Employment 'lhmsition Assistance, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1502

& 1662e. These titles offer relief to businesses and workers, providing funds for research, job
searches, relocation, and education.
147 '!\vo kinds of allowances were sold at the auction: spot and advance. "Allowances sold in
the spot sale in any year are allowances which may only be used in that year (unless banked for
use in a later year)." 42 U.S.C. § 7651o(d)(2) (Supp. V 1993) (explanation following Tbl. 2).
"Allowances sold in the advance auction in any year are allowances which may only be used in
the seventh year after the year in which they are first offered for sale (unless banked for use
in a later year)." [d.
148 First Auction of Pollution Allowances Produces Lower Than Predicted Bids, Am WATER
POLLUTION REP., Apr. 5, 1993, No. 14, Vol. 31.
149 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1551.32 (Anderson 1986 & Supp. 1993).
150 [d. at § 1551.34 (Supp. 1993).
161 [d. at § 1551.34(B).
162 [d. at § 1551.34(D)(3).
163 Ohio Bill Proposes Granting Partial Preapproval of CAA Compliance Costs, UTIL. ENV'T
REP., May 3, 1991 (discussing H.B. 370).
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utilities that were going to seek repayment of compliance costs incurred in the implementation of the 1990 Amendments to submit their
plans to the Public Utilities Commission for prior review. The Public
Utilities Commission would review design, cost, and the utility's efforts to continue using coal mined in Ohio. The legislature has not
passed this protectionist measure to date. l54 Ohio's boldest step is to
encourage the use of local coal through a tax credit for electric companies that use Ohio coal in coal-fired electric generating units connected to flue gas desulfurization systems or to other equipment to
handle the bypro ducts of coal combustion.l55
Kentucky implemented air pollution control with findings that there
should be maintained "a reasonable degree of purity of the air resources ... consistent with maximum employment and full industrial
development."156 Kentucky employs various strategies to make continued use of Kentucky coal competitive. Facilities that adopt fluidized
bed combustion technology157 may apply for tax exemption. l58 Corporations receive tax credits for making additions or adjustments to
heat-generating facilities that will enable these facilities to use coal.159
Under Pennsylvania's public utilities statutes, the Public Utilities
Commission will not approve contracts between a Pennsylvania public utility and a cogeneration facility that supplies electricity for resale
to the public if the cogeneration facility burns coal mined in a foreign
country.160
West Virginia statutes are the most protective in this group of
states. The West Virginia legislature, in passing its Public Energy
Authority Act in 1985,161 found that reliable energy sources were
essential to the health and economy of the United States162 and that
West Virginia has coal and other resources in abundance. l63 It further
found that:

154 Id. H.B. 370 was introduced May 19, 1993. The last action taken was to remove it to the
House Committee on Finance and Appropriations on May 25, 1993.
155 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5727.391(B) (Anderson 1991 & Supp. 1993).
156 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.20-100 (Baldwin 1993).
157 Coal can be "cleaned" at one of several stages: pre-combustion, combustion, or post-combustion. Fluidized bed combustion teclmology occurs at the combustion stage. See S. REP. No.
228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 294-95, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3677-78.
158 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.392(9).
159 Id. at § 141.041.
160 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 528(B) (1994).
161 w. VA. CODE § 5D-1-2(a).
162 Id.
163 Id. at § 50-1-2(b).
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[W]ith all due regard to the protection of the environment and
husbandry of the natural resources of this state, the health, happiness, safety, right of gainful employment, and general welfare
of the citizens of this state will be promoted by the establishment
and operation of coal fired electric generating plants and transmission facilities ....164

West Virginia further requires that West VIrginia electric utilities
favor use of domestic fuel sources in deficit capacity purchase arrangements. I65
Although these four states' economies are heavily dependent on
their high-sulfur coal mining industries, their coal laws indicate preferences for the continued use of in-state coal and the development of
alternate uses for in-state coal. The laws do not currently restrict
allowance trading between or among utilities.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Lawsuits and restrictive state laws pose various dangers to allowance trading. New York's lawsuit calls for EPA to incorporate regional
controls into emissions trades, the very restriction that Congress
rejected in passing Title IV. Thus a suit like New York's is little more
than an annoyance to the implementation of Title IV. Far more threatening to the tradeable emissions program are the regional controls
that states such as New York and Wisconsin are contemplating.
There are two dangers to allowance trading in the New York and
Wisconsin legislative approaches of implementing regional controls on
utilities. One is that if utilities must wade through layers of regulation
in addition to those already incorporated in Title IV, they may be
deterred from trading at all. This would increase each utility's cost of
complying with the mandates of Title IV. A utility that can freely
acquire allowances can obtain excess allowances so that it can continue operations without facing costly fines while it puts in place the
mechanisms, finding a source of clean coal or installing clean-coal
technology, to meet the increasingly more stringent emissions requirements. This approach has been characterized as a sort of "environmental dispatching" that would integrate S02 emissions control
into the "customary power-pooling and economic dispatching practices" already used by electric utilities to adjust volumes of electricity.I66 Using allowances will enable utilities to limit total emissions
[d. at § 5D-1-2(e).
at § 24-2-1d.
166 Joseph Gofiman, Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund, Testimony on Title IV of
164

165 [d.
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while still responding to economic growth. In regions where utilities'
overall costs are high, the sale of allowances generates revenue to
help offset costs. In areas of burgeoning population, where the demand for energy also keeps increasing, the acquisition of allowances
enables the utility to avoid having to rely solely on high-cost cleancoal technologies to maintain the statute's mandates.167
The other danger inherent in the kind of state control of emissions
trades that New York and WISconsin are calling for is that such
controls will impede the development of the emissions allowances
market. A seven-state survey of the compliance plans of Phase I
utilities suggests that these particular utilities will achieve, at a minimum, 2.5 million tons more reductions than mandated by Title IV
during the five-year period of Phase V 68 Thus, the utilities are motivated to "overcontrol,"169 since the reductions translate into tradable
allowances that are worth money.170 However, "[iJf utilities face an
allowance market burdened by regulations and restrictions on allowance trading . . . beyond those imposed by the Clean Air Act, the
financial justification for overcontrol will be weakened and the prospect of achieving early extra reductions will be dimmed."171
The implementation of regional controls such as those that New
York or Wisconsin contemplate could directly deter allowance trading
between in-state and out-of-state utilities. It is also possible that
states could use their acid deposition control laws to inhibit trading
indirectly. States' acid deposition control laws could deter trading if
they require in-state utilities to cut emissions rather than handle
excess emissions through other means, including the purchase of additional allowances. Even though some New York legislators would
like to implement state control of emissions trades, New York utilities
are currently free under New York's acid deposition laws to adopt any
feasible control technique. l72
In Wisconsin, another state where some legislators seek state control of trading, the Department of Natural Resources oversees agreements for emissions trades between Wisconsin utilities. l73 Wisconsin's
the Clean Air Act before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation, Oct. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Cngtst File.
167 [d. at 14.
168 [d. at 9.
169 [d. at 10.
170 [d. at 9.
171 [d. at 10.
1'12 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
173 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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current laws encourage local government units to handle air pollution
problems on a local and regional basis. I74 Wisconsin statutes do not yet
address trades between a major WISconsin utility and an out-of-state
utility.
Neither Maine's, New Hampshire's, Pennsylvania's, nor Iowa's acid
deposition control laws mention emissions trades. Maryland merely
requires its Department of Natural Resources to analyze the effect of
emissions trading.J75 While acid deposition control laws could be used
to restrict utilities' emissions trades, none appears to do so currently.
Similarly, states could use their coal laws to deter emissions trades.
No state overtly restricts allowance trading between utilities. Rather,
states generally protect their high-sulfur coal industries through a
statutorily expressed preference that in-state utilities burn statemined coal.
Illinois's coal laws, however, went beyond the typical preference for
use of state-mined coal. The Illinois Public Utilities Act declared that
every generator composed of two or more units with a capacity
greater than 500 megawattsI76 must include in its Clean .Air Act compliance plans the installation of scrubbersI77 to enable the units to continue to burn Illinois coal.178 The Alliance for Clean Coal, a group of
low-sulfur coal interests located in western states, sued in federal
court to enjoin enforcement of the Public Utilities Act.n9 The Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the injunction, finding that the Illinois Public Utilities Act violated the commerce clause.Iso
The state argued that the coal act did not burden interstate commerce because it did not mandate the use of Illinois coal.l81 Rather,
the law required public utilities and the public utilities commission to
take into account two factors: the need to use Illinois coal and the need
to preserve the mining of coal in the state as a valuable resource. I82
The state argued that its mere requirement that the state's largest
electric plants include the installation of scrubbers in clean air compliance plans was not a requirement that scrubbers actually be in174 WIS.

STAT. ANN. § 144.31(1)(c).
CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 3-3A-03(a)(9)(ii) (Michie 1989).
176 These are the four largest electric generating plants in Illinois.
177 A pollution-control device.
178 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 220, paras. 5/8-402.1(a)(ii), (e) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
179 Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 556 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
180 [d. at 559.
175 MD.

181

[d.

182 [d.
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stalled; the requirement would insure that installation of scrubbers
would be considered as an option.l83
The court rejected Illinois's position. It found that the Illinois Public
Utilities Act impermissibly restricted the free flow of interstate commerce.l84 The court described two different tests to determine the
constitutionality of a state statute.l85 Under the first test, a statute
that burdens interstate commerce "on its face" can only stand if the
state demonstrates that the statute fulfills a legitimate local purpose
for which there is no less-discriminatory means. l86 Under the second
test, a statute that is neutral on its face and has indirect effects on
interstate commerce can stand if the state shows that any burdens on
interstate commerce flowing from the statute are outweighed by the
local benefits.187 The court found the Public Utilities Act to be discriminatory on its face l88 because its requirement to consider the use
of Illinois coal discriminated in favor of the Illinois coal industry.ls9
Since the act was discriminatory on its face, it would be unconstitutional unless the state could demonstrate a legitimate local purpose
that could not be achieved through non-discriminatory means. loo
The state attempted to justify the Act because it would preserve
both the state's coal industry and the state's economy.191 The state also
argued that its Act was the cheapest way for the state to comply with
the Clean Air Act. l92
The court found this reasoning fallacious. With regard to clean air
compliance, the court found that the state overestimated compliance
costs because it combined actual costs of compliance, such as the cost
of buying low-sulfur coal or the cost of building scrubbers, with what
compliance could cost Illinois in a worst-case scenario under which its
coal mines were closed.193 Combining actual costs with potential economic effects was not ''preservationism and environmental efficiency,"IM
as Illinois claimed. Rather, it amounted to "naked protectionism."195
With regard to the state's argument that the act protected the state's
183 [d.

[d. at 562.
[d. at 559.
186 [d. (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979».
187 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
1&<l Alliance for Clean Coal, 840 F. Supp. at 561.
189 [d. at 560.
190 [d. at 559.
191 [d. at 56!.
192 [d. at 562.
193 [d. at 56!.
194 [d. at 562.
195 [d.
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economy, the court pointed out that the protection of a state's economy has never been a legitimate local purpose.196 Illinois's coal act thus
did not fulfill a legitimate local purpose,I97 and the court enjoined the
Illinois Commerce Commission from enforcing it.198
The effect of Alliance for Clean Coal may be felt beyond Illinois.
Under Alliance, a preference to use in-state coal that does not elevate
use of such coal to a factor in clean air compliance plans should pass
commerce clause review. The coal laws discussed in this Article aim
to protect their states' coal industries. They achieve this aim without
discriminating against interstate commerce because they have builtin safety valves. The percentage requirements and other directives
may go unfulfilled if there are overriding economic or environmental
reasons. A statute such as West VIrginia's statute on deficit capacity
purchase arrangements,I99 however, which requires utilities to use or
to favor the use of in-state coal, may fail constitutional challenges.

V.

CONCLUSION

Threats to the private trading of emissions allowances are still
incipient. Whether they materialize into full-fledged barriers remains
to be seen. Presently, state acid deposition and coal laws do not seem
to restrict utilities' ability to structure trades. Lawsuits such as New
York's create a degree of uncertainty about the viability of emissions
trading. However, the suit is unlikely to succeed: under the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments, EPA has no authority to restrict trades because Congress rejected regional limitations on allowance trading
when it debated and passed Title IV.
More troubling for the future of allowance trading is the threat of
legislation like that proposed in New York and Wisconsin. State statutes that require public disclosure and state oversight before an
in-state utility is allowed to enter into an emissions trade with an
out-of-state utility could have serious repercussions. Such statutes
could undermine the free-market incentives for private emissions
trading built into Title IV. The fledgling national market for tradeable
emissions would become a patchwork if individual states could require
state oversight of their utilities' trades. Under the free-market approach, utilities that have traded emissions have treated the trades
as routine business transactions, without having to open the contracts
196 Id.
197
198

Id.
Id.

199W.

VA. CODE § 24-2-1d (1992).
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underlying the trades to public scrutiny.200 Restrictive state statutes
would make trading cumbersome and could stifle utilities' creative
attempts to lower their S02 emissions. Title IV's free-market approach can only work if the market is free.
200

Kriz, supra note 64, at 1698.

